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Caught in a Trap: Zambia’s Mineral Tax Reforms 
David Manley  
Summary  
Any investment that involves unrecoverable costs relies on the good faith of the government not 
to raise taxes after costs have been incurred. Unfortunately, features inherent within the political 
economy of natural resource industries, and particularly within poor countries, makes a stable 
investment environment difficult to achieve. Indeed, some suggest that countries may fall into a 
trap in which one episode of instability breeds the conditions for future instability, creating a 
vicious circle that prevents a country fully benefiting from its mineral wealth. 
The recent rise in commodity prices is one feature that has influenced reforms in mineral 
industries around the world. While the general determinants are becoming better understood, 
each country may offer new insights into this problem. This paper focuses on Zambia‟s 
experience to understand what determined the tax reforms there. In addition, it explores the 
successes and failures of the mechanisms used to ensure a stable investment environment in 
Zambia. 
The paper finds that contract clauses between mining companies and the Zambian government 
provided some stability, even if no arbitration has so far occurred. In addition, certain tax 
structures imposed so far have not provided any protection. This paper suggests a better 
enabling environment, including greater diversification and government administrative capacity, 
may make these strategies more successful in the future. 
 
Keywords: Resource taxation; tax policy; mineral rich countries; resource curse; bargaining 
theory; economics and politics; Zambia   
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Introduction 
Since independence in 1964, the Zambian government's involvement in the mining sector has 
ebbed and waned: from ownership and operational control to taxation. Having nationalised the 
mining industry in 1969, state-ownership lasted 30 years until 2000. This paper concentrates on 
the relationship between the government and the mining sector from this point to the present 
day. It covers the formation of the privatisation deals and the subsequent breaking of those 
deals in 2008, and the ensuing three years of tax reforms.  
Zambia‟s experience is not unusual. Expropriation by government and general fiscal instability 
appear to be quite common in natural resource industries. This is of course a worry for the 
private sector, but can also be quite damaging for the host country.1 
To attract investment, Zambia must provide a stable fiscal and political environment. Arbitrary 
changes to the tax regime, broken contracts and the threat of outright expropriations are not 
conducive to this objective. To explore the causes and possible solutions to this instability, this 
paper will apply the insights of bargaining theory.2 Applied in this context, it sees the changing 
tax structures as the result of the shifting balance in bargaining powers between the mining 
companies and the government. To a large extent the story fits this theory, but the paper 
highlights areas Zambia‟s reform process that provide a greater level of detail to our 
understanding of this framework. In addition, on the basis of this analysis, the paper considers 
the success and failures of efforts to stabilise the tax regimes, as well as the suitability of those 
that were not imposed. To this extent, section 1 of this paper will discuss the ways in which 
bargaining theory applies to the reform of mining taxation, sections 2 and 3 will look at the 
structure of the four tax regimes, and at the factors and shifting powers that influenced those 
structures. Section 4 will address the changes to the tax structure after 2008, and section 5 will 
offer some policy suggestions for the future taxation of the mining sector. Section 6 will 
conclude. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Duncan (2006) has found significant reductions in mineral output in countries that expropriate. 
2
 Part of the branch of economics called Game Theory, the two terms are often interchangeable. The concepts in this type of 
economics are often applied to understanding how two or more entities might behave in reaching agreements to divide some 
economic resource. See Muthoo (2000) 
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1. Bargaining Theory  
1.1.  A model of tax bargaining 
Expropriation can be broken down into “direct”, meaning the state takes direct ownership of 
mining assets, or “creeping”, where the government takes a greater share of the proceeds. Both 
types of expropriation are common in the world of natural resource extraction. Extraction 
industries have witnessed cycles of expropriations globally, and often these correspond to the 
cycle of commodity prices (Chang, Hevia & Loayza, 2009).3 While fewer direct expropriations 
have occurred since the latest surge in commodity prices at the start of the millennium, there 
has been a global wave of tax increases across various resource extraction industries (Daniel & 
Sunley 2010). With regard to Zambia, the government broke the agreements it signed with the 
mining companies at privatisation in 2008 and has since implemented two further tax regimes, 
in 2009 and 2012. These expropriations are damaging to both investor and country. 
Understanding why they occur and how to prevent them is crucial. 
Bargaining theory can be helpful. We can model the investment packages and tax regimes as a 
„bargain„ struck between the government and the mining company over how to share the 
proceeds of the mining project.4 Each side must weigh up the options available to them. In 
theory, the resulting investment package reflects the difference in these options. For instance, 
consider a government with an natural resource. To secure value from this resource, the 
government can choose between offering a private mining company a contract in which the 
mining proceeds are shared, extracting the resource itself, or leaving it in the ground. For the 
mining company, its choice is between the share of the proceeds negotiated with the 
government, or the next best investment. The process is iterative. For instance, if the mining 
company has an alternative strategy that promises a greater return than the government 
contract, the government must respond by offering a higher share of the mining proceeds or 
settle with one of its other choices. 
From this it can be seen that the higher the value of the alternatives a side has, the greater its 
bargaining power and the more of the mining proceeds it can extract. The value of these outside 
options can therefore be described as each side‟s relative bargaining power. This becomes 
useful in the context of mining tax reforms, and the stability of tax regimes over time. Once the 
initial contract has been made, each side has a series of further options. For example, three 
simple choices for the government might be between remaining with the status quo, increasing 
a tax rate or direct expropriation. The mining company‟s options might include accepting the 
new tax deal, or moving operations to another country.5 
This array of options is captured in the obsolescing bargaining model which predicts that before 
investment is undertaken, power will be with the mining company. At this point it can choose to 
invest in a wide range of projects: with a large array of options, bargaining power is with the 
                                                 
3
 Hogan et a. (2010) explain that indirect expropriations where at least some of the value of the project is taken by the government, 
for example, via a tax increase, can also be considered as part of the same problem. 
4
 The mining company providing operational specialism and the investors providing capital can be distinct entities. A simplifying 
assumption in this paper is that all related parties on this side are part of the mining company. 
5
 Winters (2007) this provides a good example of how this framework can be applied to understanding the behaviour of natural 
resource relationships. 
8 
 
mining company. However, bargaining power shifts to the government once investment occurs. 
For mining, investment involves a large proportion of sunk costs, expenditure that cannot be 
reversed (Barham, Chavas & Coomes 1998).6 For the mining company, sunk investment 
increases the costs of choosing to move operations. This increases the costs of moving 
operations in the face of expropriation. Therefore, the higher these costs, the greater the 
bargaining power the government enjoys. 
Another common factor in many natural resource projects is that one of the bargaining parties is 
a sovereign government. Unlike interactions between two private agents within the same legal 
jurisdiction, the investor cannot be sure of any legal redress should the deal go awry. This lack 
of legal protection for private companies means expropriations become less costly for 
governments (Hogan, Sturzenegger & Tai 2010). The above two elements help to explain why 
expropriations are common in natural resource industries.  
A further factor is the commodity price cycle, which suggests why expropriations appear to be 
cyclical and come in waves across the world. Fluctuations in prices alter the relative value of the 
project in relation to the options available to each party. At low mineral prices, for example, 
investors may seek to put their capital in alternatives that offer a higher return. This may prompt 
the government to offer a lower tax rate or more favourable share of risks. In periods of high 
prices, mining assets offer relatively better returns than alternatives. The government can now 
afford to be less generous in its incentives to investors. 
However, a significant restraint on the government is that its actions alter the returns it can hope 
to achieve in future projects. Having expropriated one project, mining companies, and indeed 
any other investor who deals with the government, will discount the expected returns from a 
future project in line with the possibility that the government will expropriate again. Investors 
may request compensation for such a risk, reducing the potential returns that the government 
can expect to achieve (Jensen & Johnston 2010).7 In this way, the government's response to 
investors‟ fears can reduce the benefits of expropriation. However, public pressure also plays a 
role in our bargaining model. If the public perceives the country is not benefiting from the 
extraction of natural resources, such pressure may force the government to expropriate. In our 
model this can be seen as a cost to keeping the status quo – if the government does not 
expropriate it will face the wrath of the people. Public pressure concerns are particularly relevant 
in the context of mineral extraction in developing countries, where the government often has a 
weak mandate. 
1.2. Privatisation trap 
An emerging idea is that countries can fall into a trap in which political risk and low investment 
become self-perpetuating (Summers 2010).8. There are two forces at work. 
The first relates to the findings of the resource curse literature: that low-income, resource rich 
countries tend to have weak or sub-par institutions, such as the judiciary and public finance 
management, which are the very institutions needed to prevent expropriation. As a 
consequence investors perceive a higher probability of expropriation in countries without strong 
                                                 
6
 Barham, Chavas, & Coomes give a detailed account of the impact of sunk costs on the investment behaviour of extractive 
industries. 
7
 Jensen & Johnston provide empirical evidence showing that natural resource economies partially compensate for the increased 
level of political risk by offering corporate tax incentives to firms.  
8
 Larry Summers calls the phenomenon a „privatization trap‟. 
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institutions are seen. With such risks, government must compensate by offering a more 
attractive investment contract. If investors worry that a country will expropriate, they will demand 
a contract that includes a more favourable risk allocation, or they will take their investment 
elsewhere. However, if the project becomes a success then the resulting returns will be skewed 
towards the investor: the firm will earn windfall profits, which then become a valuable target for 
expropriation.9 Given potential pressure from the public and the low costs of expropriation to the 
government, such an act becomes more likely. In other words, the system can be self-fulfilling: 
the perception that the country might expropriate increases the chances of expropriation 
(Summers 2010). 
There is a further element to the trap for low-income countries. A lack of diversification in 
government revenue and poor administrative capacity within the government lend support for 
quantity or revenue-based taxes such as royalties, which provide a more reliable source of 
revenue than profits taxes and are easier to calculate.10 Despite these advantages, the resulting 
allocation of risks can be destabilising. Royalties are more regressive than profit-based taxes: 
when prices rise, profit-based tax revenue will increase faster than royalty tax revenue, given 
the government‟s ability to collect both sources of tax revenue. This means that the mining 
company is left with greater profits, which makes expropriation more valuable. 
Such taxes mean that the mining company is faced with the possibility of having to pay a royalty 
even when it is making losses. 
1.3. Proposed solutions 
There has been no single answer to the problem of expropriations. At best we can apply a 
variety of solutions in the hope of mitigating the risk. Here are three proposals that have been 
suggested, which can be classed as: 
 Contracts that impose a cost to expropriation; 
 Contracts that reduce the benefits from expropriation; and 
 Contracts that allow an orderly process of renegotiation. 
Stability clauses are the most widely used of the solutions presented here. Their aim is to 
provide the investor with the legal means to inflict a cost upon the government should that 
government undertake an action outside that stipulated in the contract. Such clauses can 
include freezing the entire fiscal and regulatory code, or allowing flexibility within individual tax 
rates so that the overall burden of taxation does not increase. 
To impose a cost on government action, stability clauses typically include some recourse to an 
international arbitrary body, for example to the World Bank‟s International Centre for Settlement 
of Investor Disputes. Yet enforcing these contracts still appears to be difficult; companies have 
brought few cases before a court (Daniel & Sunley 2010).  However, stronger international 
institutional frameworks and greater involvement in international financing markets by countries 
may strengthen this recourse.11 In addition, few court cases does not prove that stability clauses 
are ineffective. As will be seen in the case of Zambia, the mere possibility of arbitration may be 
                                                 
9
 This is supported by Chang, Hevia & Loayza, (2009) who find that „contracts for the exploitation of natural resources between 
governments and private companies are such that commodity price windfalls are mostly appropriated by private firms. 
10
 Collier (2010) suggests that such taxes might be necessary in cases of severely low capacity. 
11
 Gould & Winters (2007) show that the strengthening of international arbitration institutions such as the World Bank may have 
contributed to the observed decline in expropriations in the natural resource industry after the 1970s. 
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a sufficient deterrent. In the context of our bargaining framework, an expected cost of 
international arbitration that is only 50 per cent likely to occur may still be sufficient to prevent, or 
at least delay expropriation (Marsh 2000).  
A second method of enforcing the contract is to ensure the benefit from expropriation is low.  A 
tax regime that captures windfall profits eliminates the need to capture the same profits via 
expropriation.12 Designing such a tax requires a mechanism that can capture the windfall profits, 
but without overly reducing the expected returns for the investor. Such taxes have to be 
designed well. If the tax is too onerous it may reduce the project‟s expected return and the 
investor will demand compensation in some other respect. Administrative difficulties may also 
be a problem. A tax base net of costs is more likely to limit the impact on expectations of returns 
than one based on revenues. Yet calculating costs is more difficult for the tax administrator, and 
hence tax avoidance is more likely. Therefore a trade-off exists, use a tax that should limit the 
impact on the incentive to invest but face the risk of tax avoidance, or choose a simpler tax (not 
requiring the calculation of costs) that is likely to damage investment incentives yet reduces the 
risk of tax avoidance. Although this may not be a straight trade-off between these two options, 
since the mining company may be willing to face a simpler tax to avoid the risk of expropriation. 
The problem, therefore, is one of finding a progressive tax that does not overly damage 
expected returns, captures sufficient windfall profits to reduce the risk of expropriation while 
allowing the company to pay a price for such insurance. 
The third suggestion is to accept that there may be pressures to expropriate but to ensure that 
such reforms are done within an orderly framework. Renegotiation clauses, in effect, attempt to 
bring some form to the incomplete parts of a contract. In principle this may ease the costly 
transition from one tax regime to another. How this is actually done, however, remains 
questionable, and hence such clauses remain unpopular (Hogan, Sturzenegger & Tai 2010).  
2. Zambia’s Fiscal Regimes since 2000 
This section describes the key details of the four fiscal regimes imposed on the Zambian mining 
industry from privatisation in 2000 to 2012. Section 1 suggested that the way in which the tax 
regime is structured is a result of bargaining between the mining companies and the 
government. This is important as it allows us to map the shifts in bargaining power, which are 
reflected in the risks and returns of each side. Knowing the perceived risks and returns can also 
help to predict stability, as a tax regime in which the mining company earns large windfall profits, 
for instance, without any return to the government is inherently unstable.  
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Engel & Fischer (2010) suggest a cap on profits above a certain threshold, or a progressive tax on revenues if moral hazard is a 
likely problem. 
11 
 
2.1. Fiscal regime details 
The Zambian government has levied four fiscal regimes on the mining sector: 
 Development Agreement (DA) Regime13 
 2008 Regime 
 2009 Regime14 
 2012 Regime  
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 compare the direct tax types and allowances for each of these regimes. 
Table 2.1 Profit-based tax details across the four tax regimes 
 
DA 2008 2009 2012 
Profit tax types  
Company Income Tax rate (% of profit 
base) 
25% 30% 30% 30% 
Variable Profit Tax in effect? 
(See below for details) 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Profit tax base details 
 
Capital Depreciation Allowance (% of 
annual capital expenditure) 
100% 25% 100% 100% 
Loss carry forward (maximum years) 
15 to 20 years 
(depending on 
company) 
10 years 10 years 10 years 
Allowed Debt to Equity ratio 2:1 3:1 2:1 2:1 
 
Table 2.2 Revenue-based and other tax details across the four regimes 
 DA 2008 2009 2012 
Revenue tax types 
 
Mineral Royalty 0.6% 3% 3% 6% 
Windfall Tax No Yes No No 
Other tax types 
 
Export duty (on copper anodes) No 
15% (but with some 
waivers) 
15% (but with some 
waivers) 
10% (but with some 
waivers) 
Withholding profit tax 0% 
15% on services 
only 
15% on services 
only 
15% on services 
only 
                                                 
13
 Different tax agreements were made with each mining company in their Development Agreements with the government. In 2003 
these will unified, allowing the smaller mining companies to pay the same tax rates as the larger mines . The tax regime described 
here relates to this unified tax regime. 
14
 For a full review of the 2009 regime see Conrad, R (2011). 
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The privatisation of the Zambian copper mining industry was accompanied by tax agreements 
with the new owners of the privatised mining assets. These Development Agreements (hereafter 
referred to as DAs) were signed between 1997 and 2004. The details were different for each 
company and were confidential. Even access within government and by the tax authority 
appears to have been extremely limited. Each agreement included a stabilisation clause which 
prevented the government from increasing the burden of tax on each mining company for 15 to 
20 years, depending on the mine in question (Fraser 2007).   
A number of conditions arose which led to the government breaking the DA contracts, which I 
will look at in the next section. Here, it is worth exploring some of the key details of the various 
tax structures.  
Zambia imposed two taxes that, in different ways, were designed to capture windfall profits. The 
Windfall Tax (which appeared in 2008, but was removed from subsequent regimes) operated 
like a variable rate royalty.15 By changing the tax rate as the copper price changed, it attempted 
to capture some of the windfall profits. Its tax base was sales revenue of the company. By not 
including costs in the tax base this made it easier to administer, but could potentially tax too 
great a slice of profits for companies.  
The Variable Profit Tax (also introduced in 2008, but remained for successive regimes) used the 
following function to calculate the tax rate, which is applied to the same taxable profits as the 
Company Income Tax: 
Variable Profit Tax rate = 15% - (15% * (8% /c)) 
Where c = taxable profits / sale revenue 
Formula is only applicable if c is greater than 8%, otherwise tax rate equals 0%. 
By including costs within its tax base, the costs and benefits of this tax were the reverse of the 
Windfall Tax: it would be harder to administer, but less damaging to mining companies‟ baseline. 
2.2. Payments to ZCCM Investment Holdings  
As part of the DAs, ZCCM Investment Holdings (ZCCM-IH), the government‟s holding company 
responsible for managing the state‟s shares in the mining companies, received payments via 
price participation agreements and dividends. The details of these participation agreements 
were not well publicised, but they appear to have worked by applying a tax on a proportion of 
the sales revenue of each mining company once the prevailing copper price went above a 
certain threshold; a similar mechanism as the Windfall Tax applied in 2008. In addition, it 
appears that this tax was only applicable until a certain cumulative value of tax had been paid 
by the mining company. The revenue from this appears to have been significant, Adam (2010) 
states that this revenue source amounted to 2 per cent of export earnings in 2005, compared 
with 0.6 per cent of export earnings for the rest of the tax regime. However, the government 
                                                 
15
 It was calculated each month from the gross sales revenue of the taxpayer (in the same manner as the Mineral Royalty at the 
same time), using an increasing tax rate that depended on the average London Metal Exchange cash price (for copper) or the Metal 
Bulletin price (for cobalt)  The first $2.50 per lb was not taxed. The next $0.50 per lb was taxed at 25 per cent, the next $0.50 per lb 
was taxed at 50 per cent, while any value above $3.50 per lb was taxed at 75 per cent. The initial proposal for the Windfall Tax did 
not allow it to be deductible against taxable profits for the calculation of company income tax, but this was soon removed. 
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could not benefit from this as it was paid to ZCCM-IH, which has yet to pay a corresponding 
dividend to government (ibid).  
This is also true of the potential dividend earnings from the government‟s 10 to 20 per cent 
shares in the mining companies. These shares were held by ZCCM-IH into which the dividends 
and proceeds from the price participation agreements were paid. While in principle ZCCM-IH 
would then pay a dividend to the government and other minority shareholders, the privatisation 
arrangements had ensured that a large proportion of the liabilities of the former nationalised 
mining company, Zambian Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), including pension liabilities, 
were held by ZCCM-IH, rather than the private owners.  
2.3. Revenue response to price changes 
An important aspect of the fiscal regimes described in this paper is the degree to which 
government revenue increases in response to changes in the mineral price. Three factors are 
considered here. Firstly, a series of effective tax rates are calculated for each of the four fiscal 
regimes over a range of possible copper prices. These calculations do not include the effects of 
depreciation, ring-fencing and loss carry forward provisions that combine to reduce government 
revenue in the early years of mining operations. The effect of these instruments in each of the 
four regimes is discussed next. Lastly, the fiscal regimes are analysed with regard to the 
susceptibility to tax avoidance. A fiscal regime that is susceptible to tax avoidance is likely to be 
less responsive to price changes, as mining companies seek to reduce their tax burden. 
Effective tax rate response to price changes 
To understand how each of these tax regimes may have affected the industry, the Effective Tax 
Rate is measured for a stylised mining company. This is used to illustrate the risk/return 
characteristics of the tax regime and should not be seen as a reliable estimate of the true tax 
burden on mining companies in Zambia. 
An effective tax rate (ETR) is defined in this paper as:16 
ETR = Total value of tax payments / before-tax profits 
The ETR therefore shows the proportion of before-tax profits that accrue to the government. 
The remainder (1 – ETR) is the proportion of before-tax profits that accrues to the mining 
company. An ETR can measure the proportion of total project return over the lifetime of a 
project. Here, a simpler measure is used for two reasons: it avoids the issue of modelling a 
complete project and the assumptions that would require; it also allows a dissection of tax 
burden across different prices. 
Table 2.3 below shows a step-by-step calculation of the ETR for a mining company with unit 
costs of $3,000, and unit copper price of $6,000 under the 2008 regime. For simplicity and to 
clearly show how the ETR changes in responds to price, it is assumed that there are no capital 
costs, nor previous costs carried forward so depreciation and loss carry forward provisions are 
not included in the calculation. Export duty is also not included since many mining companies 
were given waivers on this tax. Withholding tax is also not included for simplicity. 
                                                 
16
  Daniel et al. 2010, give a summary of the tools used to evaluate mineral fiscal regimes. The effective tax rate measure used here 
is one such tool. 
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Table 2.3 Example calculation of ETR under the 2008 Regime 
Tax item Calculation Notes 
Unit price (“Revenue”) $6,000 Assumed 
Unit cost (“Cost”) $3,000 Assumed 
Before-tax Profits 
$3,000 (= $6,000 - 
$3,000) 
Revenue less Cost 
Mineral Royalty base $6,000 
Mineral Royalty base equals 
Revenue 
Mineral Royalty payable (@ 3%) $180 (= $6,000 * 3%)  
Windfall Tax base 
$490 (= $6,000 - 
$5,510) 
 
Revenue between $5,510 (the 
first Windfall tax threshold) and 
$6,000, the prevailing unit 
price. 
Windfall tax payable $122.5 (= $490 * 25%) 
Prevailing price is greater than 
$5,510 and less than $6,612. 
Therefore applicable rate 
equals 25%. 
Company Income Tax base 
$2,697.5 (= $6,000 - 
$3,000 - $180 - $122.5) 
CIT base is Revenue less Cost 
less MR payable less Windfall 
Tax payable 
Company Income Tax payable (@ 30%) 
$809.25 (= $2,697.5 * 
30%) 
 
Variable Profit Tax base $2,697.5 Equal to CIT base 
Variable Profit Tax rate 
c = $2,697.5 / $6,000 
   = 0.4495 
Variable Profit Tax rate 
=  15% - (15% * (8% 
/44.95%)) 
= 12.3% 
 
Variable Profit Tax rate = 15% - 
(15% * (8% /c)) 
Where c = taxable profits / sale 
revenue 
Variable Profit Tax payable 
$332.6 (= $2,697.5 * 
12.3%) 
 
Total tax payable 
$1,444.4 (= $180 + 
$122.5 + $809.25 + 
$332.6) 
MR + WPT + CIT +VPT. 
Constituents do not sum due to 
rounding. 
Effective Tax Rate 
48.2% (= 
$1,444.4/$3,000) 
ETR = Total value of tax 
payments / before-tax profits 
 
When revenue-based taxes are payable but profits are negative, the ETR measurement can 
become difficult to interpret, as the ETR calculation produces a negative value. For example, in 
scenario one (see below), the ETR curve would be a hyperbola. To avoid this, a modified ETR is 
used. This can be interpreted as the proportion of profits payable in tax when profits are 
positive, and the proportion of losses that are payable as tax (i.e. the royalty payment) when 
profits are negative. In the first example here, this break occurs at $3,000. At this point, unit 
costs equal price. 
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The modified ETR shows the proportion of surplus, or deficit when profits are negative, that 
accrues to the government; the remainder accrues to the mining company. Therefore the higher 
the modified ETR curve is the more of the mining surplus that accrues to the holding company. 
Conversely, when the mines are making a loss, which in scenario one is when prices are below 
$3,000, the modified ETR shows the proportion of total losses that are attributed to paying 
taxes, effectively this is when the mining company must pay a royalty tax. Figure 2.1 shows this 
modified ETR for the four tax regimes in scenario one.17 
Figure 2.1 ETR for a mine with unit costs of $3,000/tonne at different mineral prices 
 
In this illustration, the 2012 regime places the greatest tax burden on the mine when prices are 
between zero and $6,300. And, only when prices are particularly high (relative to unit costs) 
does the 2008 regime have the highest ETR. The progressivity with respect to price is almost 
wholly attributable to the Windfall Tax. This also shows that the 2012 regime is more regressive 
than the 2008 regime: the tax rate is higher at low prices (when profits are low) and lower when 
prices are high (when profits are high). The DA regime has a very low ETR for all prices. 
It is important to correctly interpret the spike when the price is $3,000. At this point the mine‟s 
only loss is from paying royalty, hence the modified ETR is 100 per cent, however, the absolute 
value of this loss is only as large as the royalty payment. Still, it highlights the regressive 
property of the mineral royalty: at low profits or even losses, the mining company must still make 
substantial mineral royalty payments. 
Figure 2.2 shows the modified ETR for a mining project with unit costs of $5,000 per tonne. This 
value is chosen to represent the unit costs that some of the „high-cost‟ mines in Zambia might 
currently operate at (World Bank 2011). Under such an assumption, the 2012 regime still has 
the highest modified ETR for prices up to $6,000, but is then overtaken by the 2008 regime. 
This illustrates the weakness of the Windfall Tax in the 2008 regime: it could not adjust the tax 
burden to different cost structures, meaning the tax burden can be high even if profits are not. 
The same effect is present in the 2012 regime as it has a relatively high royalty rate, although 
the magnitude is less.    
 
                                                 
17
 Calculations are shown in table 2.3 for one price only (at $6,000). The ETR at other prices is calculated in the 
same manner allowing the price to vary. 
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Figure 2.2 ETR for a mining company with unit costs of $5,000/ tonne  
 
All four tax regimes allow a mining company to delay paying tax at the start of an investment 
project. This is done in two ways. The higher the depreciation rate, the more investment costs a 
company can claim in the first years of investment. All but the 2008 allow a company to claim all 
investment costs in the year in which the investment is made. This reduces the amount of tax 
the company will pay in the early years of an investment. The loss carry forward provision, 
which all the regimes have, increases this delay as the losses claimed in the first year are rolled 
over to subsequent years. 
These provisions work to reduce the tax payable on income. Revenue from the Mineral Royalty 
and Windfall Tax was not affected by these measures, which meant the government could enjoy 
some revenue as long as the mining companies made sales. The DA regime, however, had a 
mineral royalty rate of 0.6 per cent, so the revenue protection from this source would have been 
significantly less than the other tax regimes which had Mineral Royalty rates of at least 3 per 
cent.  
The effect of tax deductions on the responsiveness to price changes 
All four fiscal regimes allowed deductions to taxable profits such as the depreciation allowance, 
and loss carry forward provisions. Since mining operations typically incur large costs upfront 
these deductions can ensure that taxable profits are zero for many years. Revenue 
responsiveness to price changes is therefore diminished during the first years of operations. Tax 
types not based on taxable profits (such as the Mineral Royalty) can provide some revenue 
during this period. However, the DA regime lacked this safeguard. The particularly low Mineral 
Royalty rate (at 0.6 per cent) resulted in insignificant government revenue over first six years 
after privatisation, as figure 3.2 in the next section shows. 
Risk of tax evasion and avoidance 
The above illustrations make some simplifying assumptions. First, the possibility that mining 
companies might avoid or evade taxes is not captured.18 It is likely that that the actual tax 
burden was reduced by such practices in all of the tax regimes. Some of this is a reflection of 
the poor capacity of the Zambian authorities to administer taxes, which is considered later in the 
paper. However, some of the tax regimes made it easier to avoid taxes, and harder for the tax 
authorities to administer the same taxes. In particular, profit-based taxes, which involve the 
                                                 
18
 A company that avoids taxes is behaving legally to reduce its tax base, a company that evades taxes is doing so illegally. 
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calculation of both revenue and costs of a company are more difficult to administer than 
revenue-based taxes which require only the calculation of revenue. The DA regime relied almost 
exclusively on the Company Income Tax (profit-based) so was most at risk from tax avoidance. 
The other tax regimes had higher rates for Mineral Royalty, so these revenue streams were less 
likely to be reduced by such practices. Other details added to this effect. Table 2.4 shows five 
elements of the tax structure that decreased the risk of tax avoidance. It shows that the DA 
regime was devoid of all these measures which could have allowed mining companies to reduce 
their tax payables. 
Table 2.4 Tax avoidance protection in each tax regime 
Type of protection How it works DA 2008 2009 2012 
Royalty base uses LME 
price 
Avoids relying on realised prices provided by mining 
company 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Related party 
transactions use LME 
price 
Avoids relying on realised prices provided by mining 
company 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Hedging tax base 
separate from 
operational tax base 
Prevents reduction of taxable profits through various 
derivative trading strategies 
No Yes No Yes 
Ring-fencing 
Avoids new investment projects reducing profits of 
older projects. 
No Yes Yes Yes 
 
2.4. Competitiveness 
The final analytical dimension is the competitiveness of the tax regimes. Without a full timeline 
of tax rates, it is difficult to know to what extent the DA regime was competitive in 2000, but 
there are indications that it was significantly lower than Zambia‟s competitors, see below. As the 
CEO of one mine was quoted as saying: 
Going through the Development Agreements for the two companies which we own … I 
would say they are very fair, very reasonable… It must be one of the more attractive 
places to invest in globally in terms of new mining ventures. (Fraser 2007) 
Zambia‟s tax rate rose after this, bringing it closer to the global average, but tax rates around 
the world also increased, lessening any changes to Zambia‟s relative competitiveness. By the 
end of the decade, many mineral producing countries had also increased their tax rates (Daniel 
D. et al 2010). 
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show a snapshot of tax regimes in major copper producing regions as of 
2011. If tax regimes have not changed too radically over the last decade, then this suggests 
much of Zambia‟s tax structures are not too far removed from global norms. The DA regime 
mineral royalty rate of 0.6 per cent is, however, the lowest in this group. 
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Table 2.5 Selection of tax rates of major copper producing countries, as of 2011 
Country Royalty Rate (on copper) Company Income Tax Rate Type of Excess Profit Tax Used 
Zambia (DA) 0.6% 25% No 
Zambia (2008) 3% 30% Yes 
Zambia (2009) 3% 30% Yes 
Zambia (2012) 6% 30% Yes 
Australia 
4% (New South Wales) 
18% (Northern Territory) 
30% Yes, introduced in 2011 
Canada 
15% (British Colombia) 
5 to 10% (Saskatchewan) 
Canada: federal rate 18% 
(2010), 16.5% in 2011  
Plus provincial taxes (Ex. 
British Colombia 10.5% in 
2010, 10% in 2011; Sask. 10%) 
No 
Chile 0 to 5% 
Chile: 20% First Category Tax + 
Global Complementary +  
Additional Tax on Non-residents 
No 
China 2% plus 7rmb per tonne 25% No 
DRC 2% 30% No 
Indonesia 4% 25% No 
Kazakhstan 5.7% 
20% plus 15% branch profits 
tax 
0-60% on portion of net income 
that  exceeds 25% of deductions 
Mongolia 5% 
10% for first MTN 10bn (c.$7.5 
m); 25% thereafter 
New variable royalty based on 
price from Jan 2011. Rates from 
5% to 15% when output is 
concentrated. 
Peru 1 to 3% 30% No 
Russia 8% 20% No 
South Africa 
Unrefined: 0.5+(EBIT/(gross 
sales*9))*100, max 7% Refined: 
0.5+(EBIT/(gross sales*12.5))*100, 
max 5% 
28%; branch profits tax of 33% No 
United States 2 to 5% 
15-35% on residents/ 30% 
branch profits tax  
(AZ 6.97%, NV – no tax)a 
No 
Source: Conrad (2012) 
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Table 2.6 Treatment of taxable profits 
Country Treatment of Development Expenses Ring-fencing Thin Capitalisation (debt-to-equity ratio) 
Zambia (DA) Immediate No 2:1 
Zambia (2008) Over 4 years Yes 3:1 
Zambia (2009) Immediate Yes 2:1 
Zambia (2012) Immediate Yes 2:1 
Australia 
Immediate 
 
No 3:1 
Canada Immediate No 2:1 
Chile Immediate No 3:1 
China Amortised Yes 2:1 
DRC    
Indonesia Amortised Yes No specific rules 
Kazakhstan Immediate Yes Specific formula 
Mongolia Pre-production expense, 5 years No  
Peru  Yes 3:1 
Russia Immediate No 3:1 
South Africa Immediate Yes 3:1 
United States 70% in first year, straight line in next 5 years No 1.5:1 
Source: Conrad (2012) 
3. Bargaining Power 
3.1. Conditions generating DA regime 
Section 2 showed that the DA regime was particularly favourable for the mining companies at 
privatisation. This section details how this was the result of the Zambian government's low 
bargaining power. 
The first option for the government at privatisation could have been to remain with the status 
quo: continue running its nationalised mining company, the Zambian Consolidated Copper 
Mines (ZCCM). This had already proved costly for the government and indications were that it 
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would remain that way. ZCCM‟s financial performance had declined in the years leading up to 
privatisation in 2000 (see Table 3.1).  Furthermore, ZCCM's financial accounts suggested that 
these losses, on the whole, were shouldered by the government and thus a particularly large 
burden for Zambia. For instance, in 1998, losses amounted to 9 per cent of GDP. 
Table 3.1 ZCCM’s profitability up to privatisation 
Year Pre-tax profit margin Pre-tax Income/GDP 
1990 17% 2% 
1991 17% 3% 
1992 13% 2% 
1993 19% 4% 
1994 -14% -3% 
1995 na na 
1996 -1% 0% 
1997 -14% -4% 
1998 -47% -9% 
1999 -25% -3% 
Source: ZCCM annual reports, CSO 
This performance was partly attributed to the low levels of investment in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Capital was needed, not only to open up newer ore bodies, but also to maintain existing 
operations.19 But the government could not afford to continue to cover ZCCM‟s operating losses, 
nor to finance the necessary investment projects.20 This is evidenced by the significant debt 
accumulated by the government and the reluctance of lenders to continue financing the 
government‟s operations. Central government debt stood at 193% of GDP in 1996, (although 
this was lower than the 277% at the start of Zambia‟s liberalising period in 1991). 21 Neither 
could Zambia continue to rely on external assistance as loan conditions from international 
donors were contingent on the completion of privatisation of the mining sector (Craig 2001; 
Lungu 2008).   
An alternative to bailing out the mining industry was to let it collapse, but this was not viable 
either. A collapse would have eliminated Zambia‟s main source of foreign exchange and cause 
widespread unemployment. Formal employment was already very low; falling 14 per cent, from 
a high of 546,000 in 1992 (just before liberalisation policies started), to 467,000 in 1998 (Central 
Statistical Office).  Of this, the mining industry contributed 11 per cent or 57,000 jobs before the 
first wave of privatisation in 1997. Although a comparatively small amount in a population of 
almost 10 million (as of 2000), each job was comparatively well paid and supported an extended 
network of family dependants (Committee of Economic Affairs and Labour 2009).   
Public pressure on the government was also growing. The critical problem was the fall in 
prosperity compared with the seemingly successful days of national control of the mining 
industry. Copperbelt residents were accustomed to a reasonable level of economic well-being.  
                                                 
19
 Craig (2001) says that in 1992, $2 billion of new investment was required to  maintain operations and to open up the Konkola 
mine to supplement the declining reserves in the old mines such as Nchanga. 
20
 Edith Nawakwi, the finance minister, was quoted as saying that the Zambian government had been forced to give the equivalent 
of $1m a day to the industry. (Taxing Questions Programme two, 2007, BBC world service)  
21
 World Bank Development Indicators. Found at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
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By the early 1970s, the Copperbelt was in effect a collection of well-run and prosperous 
company towns populated by a relatively well-educated, well-paid and heavily urbanized 
labour force that both enjoyed high quality cradle-to-grave welfare provision, courtesy of 
the mining houses. (Adam 2010)  
Yet following the liberalising policies of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD, which 
won power in 1991) in which ZCCM was forced to reduce its work force in response to low 
profits, the Copperbelt experienced a long decline between the 1990s and early 2000s. In terms 
of direct mining employment, 81,300 people were employed in the industry in 1975. This fell to 
39,996 in 2001. Unemployment was a likely influence on the election results of 2001, although 
the dominant themes were corruption and the unpopularity of Frederik Chiluba, the president. 
While the MMD had enjoyed success in the 1991 and 1996 elections, gaining over 70 per cent 
of the vote in each, it won only 27 per cent in 2001. Although this won them the election, having 
gained more seats than any other party, it was a steep decline from previous elections. 
A further contribution to the country‟s poor bargaining power, was that Zambia was not 
competitive compared to other investment destinations. Mining investment in general was 
slumping. Since 1970, real copper prices had been on a long-term downward trend (see Figure 
3.1), expectations of future copper prices appear to have been low, and by 1998, copper mining 
investment was falling world-wide (Craig 2001).  
Figure 3.1 Copper price in 2011 prices, $ per metric tonne 
 
US Bureau of Labour Statistics , US Geological Survey (copper prices), and Author‟s calculations 
In addition, Zambia‟s assets, in particular, were probably relatively uncompetitive. In 2009, 
almost all of Zambia‟s mines had operating costs in the top quartile of the world‟s copper mines 
(World Bank 2011). These relatively high costs can be  partly explained by the age of the mines, 
many of which had been in operation since the 1930s, as well as the lack of investment in 
ZCCM. 
These problems meant that few investors were attracted to ZCCM‟s assets without significant 
price and tax discounts. When ZCCM was unbundled and separate packages offered for sale, 
few received substantial bid offers. For example, „Package A‟, which contained the Nchanga 
mine and represented about 60 per cent of ZCCM production attracted only one bid, although, 
as Craig (2001) points out, this may have been the result of coordination among bidders to 
secure the assets at below market value. Even after privatisation in 2000, demand for Zambia's 
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assets was low as reflected by the sale of Konkola Copper Mines. The government found a 
buyer only in 2004, selling the mines for $50m to Vedanta. In 2005, Vedanta had made an 
operating profit of $52m (Haglund 2010).   
Using our bargaining theory, Zambia then had little option but to provide the mining companies 
with agreements packed with incentives. This power, however, was to shift as the prices of 
copper increased and the government found itself in a stronger negotiating position.  
3.2. Conditions generating further tax reform 
After the government had seemingly „sold the family silver‟, the next decade saw a slow shift in 
power away from the mining companies. There were three factors that influenced this shift, each 
of which were exacerbated by a number of other circumstances: 
 public pressure, generated by the rise in copper prices and fall in economic conditions;  
 the high investment which represented high sunk costs for the industry; and  
 the threat of arbitration, which gave the government some pause for thought before 
completely overhauling the tax regime.  
 
Figure 3.2 Copper price, production, tax revenue and capital expenditure in Zambia’s 
mining industry 
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Price and Copper production: Bank of Zambia; Tax revenue: Zambia Revenue Authority, Capital Expenditure: Chamber of Mines 
(2010) 
3.2.1. High company profits and low tax revenues spark public pressure  
For the first four years after privatisation in 2000, comparatively little changed. Copper prices 
fluctuated below $2,000/tonne; annual investment was only a little above pre-privatisation days; 
and tax revenues and dividends were negligible. Only in 2004 did circumstances change. Prices 
started to rise and continued to do so until 2008 when they reached $7,500/tonne. Figure 3.2 
shows the changes in four fundamental variables in this period. 
Critically, despite these rises in price, investment and production, the most important variable for 
Zambia, tax revenue, did not change appreciably. From 2005, tax revenue did improve 
somewhat, but this was not commensurate with the growing production and prices that the 
public could observe. For instance, from 2000 to 2007 a total of $246m was collected in tax 
compared with an estimated $12,240m worth of copper exports. This amounted to 3.4 per cent 
of total tax revenue during this period.22 Furthermore, from privatisation to the present, only one 
dividend has been paid by the industry and this has gone to repay liabilities from pre-
privatisation not to benefit the government‟s budget.23 Importantly, while Figure 3.2 shows that 
tax revenues did finally increase, this was too late; tax revenues only reached significant levels 
by 2010, after Zambia had broken the DAs. 
As this trend continued, there was a growing perception within society that the mines had gotten 
the better deal. An important element of this was a public campaign by opposition politicians, 
academics and local and international NGOs. Because of the secrecy surrounding the DAs, the 
campaign was the only way to inform the public. In 2004, opposition politicians began 
requesting information from the government, supported by academics and local NGOs. 
According to Dymond (2007), NGOs, trade unions and academics „made the government wake 
up to the fact that there has not been much benefit to Zambia from high copper prices‟. 
International NGOs and academics, via these reports as well as blogs24, provided a significant 
amount of research expertise, such as publishing reports advocating for change in Zambia.25 
A key problem was that these perceptions were based on observing production and prices. No 
one, except the mining companies themselves, knew what the costs were, and hence could not 
tell if the industry was really making extraordinary profits. As was the case for the authorities at 
the time, and even today, it is not possible to determine how much return the mining companies 
make. At least one mining company recognised that the companies had got „an absurdly good 
deal‟ (Fraser 2007). Conversely, other companies argued that their costs were rising. Figure 3.3 
shows the unit costs as stated by two large mining companies. 
 
 
                                                 
22
 Estimated by using average annual London Metal Exchange (LME) copper price multiplied by total production in 2007. Production 
information from Bank of Zambia. 
23
 Kansanshi declared a dividend of $18.1 million to ZCCM-IH, the state holding company of mining assets in May 2010. (State 
House,2010). Despite this income fro ZCCM-IH, the Zambian government has not benefited. According to recent ZCCM-IH annual 
reports, no dividend has been declared by the holding company itself (ZCCM-IH annual reports 2005 to 2011). 
24
 See ZambianEconomist.com and minewatchzambia.blogspot.co.uk 
25
 Examples include: Dymond (2007); Christian Aid (2007); Fraser (2007); Lambrechts (2009)  
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Figure 3.3  Unit costs and LME average annual price, $/ metric tonne 
 
Source: World Bank (2011); Chamber of Mines (2010), Bank of Zambia. 
Regardless of whether the data were true or not, it was the public perception that the mines 
were reaping high profits that fuelled calls for reform. Several elements of the DA regime 
exaggerated this problem. Section 3 showed that under the DA regime, rising mineral prices did 
not affect taxes during the early years of the investment project. Once the industry had 
eliminated the losses it carried forward each year, tax revenues would increase, but this did not 
satisfy the public who were not willing to wait.  
Secondly, the Development Agreements, and indeed much of government‟s interaction with the 
mining industry, was shrouded in secrecy. To this day, these agreements have been kept 
confidential and only made public via a leak. This secrecy even prevented some government 
institutions whose task it was to regulate the industry (Fraser 2007). In addition, there were no 
statistics on the amount of tax paid by the mines at the time. This made it almost impossible for 
the public to monitor the government and industry, which automatically bred an atmosphere of 
distrust and fuelled public pressure for reform. This weakened what social-contract the people 
had with both the government and the industry. They were being asked to trust that tax revenue 
would eventually flow, yet there was no evidence to support such a belief. Indeed, the fragments 
of information that did appear, via the efforts of the concerned parties described above, 
suggested that Zambia was almost giving away its mineral wealth.  
Lastly, the lack of tax revenues also prompted accusations of tax evasion and avoidance, and it 
became clear that the authorities lacked the capacity to administer taxation. This was not helped 
by the structure of the tax regime itself, being as it was, based predominantly on profits and 
lacking in safeguards against tax planning practices. The lack of ring-fencing was particularly 
damaging, as the rush of investment after 2004 could be used to reduce the taxable profits of 
those assets that were already in operation. 
3.2.2. Economic factors 
Compounding the lack of tax revenues in the face of increasing copper prices was the poor 
state of the local economy in the Copperbelt, the main mining district in Zambia. Privatisation 
did not significantly improve economic life in the Copperbelt. The fall in employment which had 
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begun in 1991, did reverse after privatisation, but it was still below the pre-1991 heights. 
However, as with the tax revenues, the increase may have been too little too late. It was only 
after the breaking of the DAs and the 2008 tax reforms that employment increased substantially. 
Figure 3.4 Formal employment in Zambia’s mining industry 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office, Zambia 
It is more difficult to measure the impact on local industry and this second indirect source of 
employment. The nationalised companies had often procured inputs from the local industry. The 
Development Agreements included clauses that were meant to encourage use of local suppliers 
as much as possible,26 but the extent to which this was followed is uncertain. Some mining 
companies did procure a significant amount from local suppliers, while others preferred to 
import (Haglund 2010; Christian Aid 2007). Given the increasing use of technology in modern 
mining, it is unlikely that the local economy could provide a significant share of inputs to the 
mining industry (Auty 2006). This fall in demand for local production may have contributed to the 
growing resentment in the Copperbelt (Christian Aid 2007).  
3.2.3. Political factors 
The lack of tax revenues, as well as a depressed economic environment, created resentment 
among the public. The build-up in public pressure was clearly demonstrated in the 2006 
election. Although slightly better than 2001, the MMD still only managed to win 40 per cent of 
the vote. In particular, the MMD lost support in the two urban conglomerations of Lusaka, the 
capital, and the Copperbelt. At least part of the discontent was underpinned by the failure of the 
mines to benefit Zambians. As Charles Husband, a mining specialist at the World Bank, 
observed: 
Part of [the reason] why the MMD lost the election on the Copperbelt, was that the 
population around the mines [were] not seeing any benefits. So there has been a 
backlash, tremendous pressures. (Haglund 2010) 
It is difficult to determine whether the government moved to reform the mining tax regime 
because of mounting public pressure or because of the election results. While the election 
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 Development Agreements, available from http://minewatchzambia.blogspot.co.uk/ 
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results showed the government the cost of not reforming taxes, the growing public hostility 
towards the mines also represented a cost to the industry of resisting reforms. This hostility was 
forcibly demonstrated by a growing number of strikes during this time. This fed the pressure for 
change, as not only were they campaigning for better pay but also tax reform – both to increase 
taxes on the mining industry and use these proceeds to reduce taxes for the mining workers, 
and increase spending in the mining districts (Lusaka Times 2008). Guy Scott, the leader of the 
opposition Patriotic Front added to the pressure on the mines in 2008 when he promised to lead 
a demonstration against the industry in the Copperbelt if it refused to accept tax reform.  
3.2.4. Immovable assets 
In addition to this growing pressure for tax reform, the increasing capital expenditure by the 
industry likely represented a falling cost to expropriation for the government. As Figure 3.4 
shows, following the rise in copper price, capital expenditure in the mining industry rose 
considerably. Given the nature of mining, many of these assets, such as the mining shafts and 
pits, would have been immovable. This may have increased the bargaining position of the 
government, as companies could not move them in response to a tax hike. Fraser (2007) shows 
that the mines themselves recognised that given the large investments they had made, they 
would have to stay in Zambia until they could make enough return. 
3.2.5. Arbitration 
The increasing windfall profits, the rising public pressure for change and the growing capital 
expenditure all combined to make expropriation more attractive. Yet, the government only 
imposed tax reforms in 2008. A strong deterrent was the threat of international arbitration 
promised in the DA contracts. The Development Agreements had stipulated that any contract 
disputes would be handled by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.27 
While this failed to prevent the government reforming taxes in 2008 without any arbitration case 
being made by the mining industry, it represented a significant enough threat for the government 
to delay tax reform for much of the decade. Even in 2007, when calls for reform were 
particularly strong, for the government team tasked with exploring possible reforms, the most 
significant obstacle appears to have been the possibility of arbitration if Zambia broke the DAs.28 
4. The Reform Process 
By 2007, the underlying conditions had created an environment ripe for tax reform. Yet, there 
followed four years of instability in which the „official‟ tax regimes of 2008 and 2009 were not 
honoured by the industry. To some extent these changes still match those predicted by the 
bargaining framework. The effective tax rate follows the cycle of copper prices throughout this 
period, but a number of other factors were also important in explaining the reform process. This 
section describes these details.   
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 See, for example, clause 22 of Mopani Copper Mines‟ Development Agreement contract. Available from 
minewatchzambia.blogspot.co.uk 
 
28
 Author‟s interview with a Zambian government official. Lusaka, September 2011. 
27 
 
4.1. The 2008 regime  
The first point was that the Zambian government broke the stability clauses within the DAs 
without any negotiation with the mining industry. This was roundly criticised (Lungu 2008) and 
appears to have taken the mining companies by surprise even though they had previously 
appeared willing to negotiate (Committee of Economic Affairs 2007). It is difficult to know 
whether the sudden reforms damaged government-industry relationship, making future 
negotiations more difficult. Other countries which were also undertaking reforms at this time 
offered their industries the chance to negotiate, with graduated „paths‟ to paying the new tax 
regimes.29 But, while Zambia's move may have been dramatic, there was also a logic to it. By 
imposing a high tax rate, the government could start negotiations with the industry using this as 
the baseline, rather than negotiating up from the DA regime. In addition, given the lengthy 
delays that had already occurred to get this far, combined with the mounting public pressure, the 
government may have been worried that any negotiation would drag on, and that only a sudden 
reform would placate the public. 
4.1.1. Mining companies' bargaining power  
Underlying these two issues was the fact that the mining companies still had some bargaining 
power to call upon. 
Firstly, the industry could have invoked the stabilisation clauses in the Development 
Agreements. Some elements in the industry stated that they were considering arbitration, but it 
appears that they would use this as a bargaining tool rather than automatically use the „nuclear 
option‟ (Daniel & Sunley 2010).  For instance, a senior mining executive from a mining house 
said: 
We have Development Agreements in place and they still have a decade to run. We will 
go ahead with international arbitration if this fiscal regime goes ahead, but we trust it will 
not come to that. (MiningMX 2008) 
This could be seen as a case of brinkmanship as the arbitration option was costly to both 
parties. There was a strong chance that the government would lose if arbitration was chosen. 
On the other hand, a long public court case may have damaged the mining companies as well, 
both in terms of their international and local image. Public demonstrations in the Copperbelt 30 
and frequent labour strikes showed that the industry‟s social contract was already weak; taking 
a poor developing country to court may not have improved this. Given the potentially high costs 
of this strategy, the mines were probably looking for alternative ways out. 
A second threat at the industry‟s disposal, was the reduction of investment in Zambia. In a 
parliamentary hearing in 2008, the Chamber of Mines argued that the new tax regime would 
lead to cuts in investment, job losses and a recession . At the same hearing, First Quantum 
Minerals said: 31 
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 For example Tanzania allowed for renegotiations while Chile gave mining companies a choice of „paths‟ which they could take in 
migrating to their proposed new tax regime. (Daniel D. & Sunley, 2010)  
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 Mine Watch: February 29, 2008 
31
 Mine Watch: February 29, 2008: FQM also questioned its investment of its Bwana Mkubwa mine, „leading possibly to a loss of 600 
jobs‟ 
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If government says it wants to take so much from the mining companies through high 
taxes, then we can also decide to stop developing the industry and this will not be a 
good thing to do.  
This was probably not a credible threat, at least in hindsight. The mines had invested a great 
deal by this stage, much of which was irreversible. In addition, as investments often linked 
previous projects, such as new smelters to process output from established mines, stopping 
further investment would harm the returns made on existing projects. Even among the 
incumbent mining companies, other statements appear to have undermined this threat. For 
instance, Konkola stated: 32 
We shall continue to increase our investments despite the new mineral taxes. Our US$1 
billion investment in the KDMP [Konkola Deep Mine Project] and the smelter project are 
on track. 
Connected to this was the silent threat from potential future investors. Even if the incumbents‟ 
threats were not credible, this potential cost was. Although the minister of finance had argued 
that the tax proposals were competitive, investors would perceive the breaking of contracts as a 
political risk. 
With the strength of these threats, the industry had enough bargaining power to erode the tax 
proposals both before and after they were made applicable in April 2008, and to refuse to pay 
what they saw as the most egregious parts of the proposals with little response from the 
authorities.  
A particular source of contention was the imposition of the Windfall Tax. The initial proposal was 
that the Windfall Tax would be applicable alongside the Variable Profit Tax and would not be 
deductible against the Company Income Tax. This would have resulted in a very high effective 
tax rate when prices were high enough to trigger the top 75 per cent rate of the Windfall Tax.33   
Partially because of the seemingly unreasonableness of the proposal, and partly because of the 
residual bargaining power of the industry, the mining companies lobbied successfully to amend 
this problem. This meant that from April 2008 when the proposals become law, the Variable 
Profit Tax would only apply in months in which the Windfall Tax had not been paid, an apparently 
complex concession.34 However, even after this victory, the majority of the industry still refused 
to pay the tax. This suggests that these companies, seeing that they had won one battle, 
decided they were strong enough to carry on and further erode the government‟s position. 
Indeed, the government then responded by agreeing to limit the tax to only the first 25 per cent 
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 Mine Watch: April 7, 2008 
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 In the model shown in section 3, for a mine with costs of $5,000 per tonne and prices of $7,000 (similar to the average price at the 
time) the ETR would be 67.2 per cent when the Windfall Tax is not deductible and both Windfall Tax and Variable Profit Tax are 
applicable at the same time. When the final 2008 regime is considered, Windfall Tax is deductible and the two taxes are not 
applicable at the same time, the ETR is 52.3 per cent. 
34
 The government had acquiesced to this demand to some degree, yet despite the new tax regime becoming law, only two 
companies out of eleven had complied with the payment of windfall taxes. Even those that did pay added disclaimers to their tax 
accounts stating that payment of taxes did not imply acceptance of the tax regime, so that the possibility of arbitration would still be 
available to them. Committee of Estimates (2008).  
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threshold, so that the second and third thresholds with rates of 50 per cent and 75 per cent 
would not be applicable.35 But again, most companies refused to pay the Windfall Tax. 
4.1.2. Further shifts in bargaining power 
Having proposed a particularly high tax regime, the government then conceded on some parts. 
Two events changed the balance of power further and resulted in greater dilution of the 2008 
regime. On August 19, 2008, President Levy Mwanawasa died, sparking an election which saw 
finance minister Ngandu Magande replaced by Situmbeko Musokwotwane. There were 
concerns that the new leadership might not be as focused on the reforms as Mwanawasa and 
Magande. 
The second, possibly more influential, event was the global financial crisis which precipitated a 
large fall in copper prices and a fall in investor confidence. After a continual rise since 2004, the 
price of copper peaked in July 2008 before falling to $3,000 per tonne by January, 2009. Over 
these months, a number of mining operations halted production or reduced employment.36 By 
September 2009, a Committee of Economic Affairs and Labour report said that 10,000 jobs had 
been lost in the mining sector due to the crisis: a fifth of the industry, or two per cent of total 
formal employment in the country (Committee of Economic Affairs and Labour 2009). The 
document also reported research findings from one NGO that said this would affect 60,000 
dependants. This would have been a serious concern for the government. Given the 
dependence of many in the Copperbelt towns on these mines, the result was severe economic 
hardship for its citizens (Irin News 2009).  
4.2. The 2009 regime 
With the 2008 reforms still in dispute and a fast declining copper price, the government 
announced the 2009 mining tax reforms. This gave the industry a number of concessions 
relative to the previous regime, although the effective tax rate was still higher than under the DA 
contracts. However, almost immediately after the 2009 regime was enacted, conditions 
improved and the threat of industry closures was lifted. In hindsight, these concessions appear 
to have been too excessive and one could accuse the government of overreacting to the crisis, 
but at the time there was little certainty over how the financial crisis and the resulting drop in 
copper prices would play out. 
Despite the concessions, the industry continued to pay taxes according to the DA regime, not 
the 2009 regime, and negotiations on further reforms continued. Local and overseas NGOs and 
opposition parties strengthened their lobbying campaign, clamouring for a return of the Windfall 
Tax. A key part of their argument was that because the Zambian Revenue Authority (ZRA) did 
not have the capacity to properly administer profit-based taxes, the Windfall Tax should be used 
until capacity improved. By this time a specialised mining tax unit had been established within 
the ZRA. Assuring the public that the ZRA now had the capacity to administer the current tax 
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 First Quantum Minerals (2008) shows there was some confusion over this. It refers to a ZRA communication with First Quantum 
that reads: “… will with immediate effect be required  to pay windfall tax on a provisional basis at a flat rate of 25% at any price 
above the first trigger price ...” . 
36
 Bwana Mkubwa laid off 286 workers. Luanshya halted production in December 2008. All 1,740 employees were be laid off. 
Chambeshi Metals Plc shut down. Mopani Copper Mines laid off 1,000 of its 16,000 employees by the end of February 2009. 
Konkola Copper Mines laid off 700 of its workforce of 15,000 after shutting down its smelting plant. (Reuters, 2008), (Lusaka Times, 
2008a), (Afrik-News, 2009) 
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regime, the government publicly stated that the Windfall Tax would not return (Lusaka Times 
2010). 
The impending election was also a significant threat for the mining industry. The opposition party 
had campaigned during the 2006 elections on a platform of increasing mining taxes and had 
only narrowly lost. Without funds to secure votes, it was feared the ruling MMD party might lose, 
ushering in a more populist anti-investor administration. It was in the industry‟s interest to 
conclude a deal with the incumbent government to reduce public and budget pressures; the cost 
of this deal may have been less than the anticipated cost of a populist administration. Some 
agreement appears to have been concluded in November 2010. A ministerial statement says 
that the industry agreed to adhere to the 2009 regime and pay some of the debts owed from the 
2008 regime; particularly that arising from the Windfall Tax, although this was now calculated at 
a reduced 25 per cent flat rate, rather than the variable structure originally proposed.37 
4.3. The 2012 regime 
Although tax revenues increased quickly after this deal, it was not enough to save the MMD, nor 
the industry. In September 2011, the Patriotic Front and its leader, Michael Sata, won the 
elections. Many parties lobbying for a return of the Windfall Tax expected to be satisfied with the 
new government. Yet, despite their previous promises, the PF‟s budget included no such reform. 
Instead, the government doubled the Mineral Royalty rate. This potentially was even more 
damaging for the industry than a Windfall Tax. Section 3 estimated that the increase in Mineral 
Royalty resulted in an effective tax rate for the 2012 regime that was higher than that of the 
2008 regime under certain price conditions, producing a more regressive tax system in general. 
While it is arguably the case that the industry still had the protection of the DA stability clauses, , 
there was little the mining companies did in the face of this latest rise in tax rates. There has so 
far been few public complaints by the mining companies. In addition, there is also less public 
pressure for further increases. This has probably been relieved by the comparatively high 
returns Zambia is now enjoying from the industry, and a lack of any political party to back the 
cause for further tax rises, given that the PF party, the former voice of tax reform, is now in 
power. For instance, the new tax regime saw Company Income Tax and Mineral Royalty 
accounting for 11.6 per cent of tax revenue in 2011, significantly higher than in previous years 
(ZRA).  
However, the new driver for potential reforms is the worry that poor global economic conditions 
and increased global copper supply will precipitate a price bust. It remains to be seen how this 
affects Zambia‟s mining tax regime, and Zambia itself. Even before the 2012 regime came into 
effect, the Mines Minister, Wylbur Simuusa, stated that the mineral royalty rate may fall again in 
2013 (Reuters, 2011). Although not necessarily indicative of actual government policy, such 
uncertainty does not suggest an entirely stable tax regime.  
With copper prices remaining high, reports suggest investment does not appear to have fallen 
(Lusaka Times 2012).  But this may be hiding the true cost of the story. Firstly, investors' 
perceptions of political risk in Zambia have probably been heightened due to the abrupt 
changes to the taxation system.  Zambia‟s ranking in the Behre Dolbear survey fell from 16 in 
                                                 
37
 Ministerial statement (2010)  The statement refers to another 10-year stabilisation clause. However there has been no further 
reference to this in government statements. 
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2007 to 19 in 2010, precipitated by falls in the areas of Corruption and Tax Regime (Dolbear 
2006 to 2010).  In the Policy indicator of the Fraser Institute survey, Zambia also fell from 50 in 
2007/2008 to 35 in 2010/2011 (McMahon & Cervantes, 2005 to 2010).  
In addition, the industry is also being hit by greater strike action. For mining companies whose 
goals are to deliver returns to investors, this is little different from an increase in taxes. It also 
makes Zambia less competitive. Miners‟ wages are low, but  the World Bank (2011) indicates 
that labour productivity is also low, and wages make up a large proportion of total costs, making 
Zambia less competitive. Strikes and the resulting closure of mining operations represent a 
costly way to increase Zambia‟s share of benefits from its mineral wealth. It also adds to the risk 
premium future investors may require from Zambia, hurting the country in the future. 
These developments diminish the returns future investors can expect from mining in Zambia. All 
things being equal, future tax bargains may include a greater compensation to investors for this. 
As the discussion on the natural resource trap in section 1 suggests, such developments can 
help create the conditions for further instability in the future. 
5. Policy Analysis 
This section highlights three issues which influenced the stability of Zambia‟s mining tax regime 
and makes some suggestions on how to make them stronger: 
 The stabilisation clause in the Development Agreements; 
 The success and failure of the Windfall Tax and Variable Profit Tax; and  
 The role of tax administration capacity 
5.1. Fiscal stabilisation clauses  
While ultimately, the fiscal stabilisation clauses were not sufficient to dissuade the government 
from breaking the DAs, this paper suggests that they at least helped delay the pending tax 
reform for a number of years.  The delay was crucial for the mining industry, as the years from 
2004, when copper prices started to rise, until the reforms in 2008 saw a total of $3 billion in 
investment (Chamber of Mines 2011).  Without the threat of arbitration, the government may 
have been inclined to respond sooner to public pressure and risk damaging the nascent 
investment flows into the industry. As Daniel and Sunley (2010) suggest, the stability clauses at 
least did their job of protecting the industry while it grew. 
On the other hand, the stabilisation clause may have exacerbated the instability caused by the 
shift in bargaining power. By preventing the tax regime from adjusting to new conditions, it 
allowed a build-up in public pressure. By 2008, this pressure may have forced the government 
to overreact: imposing a much higher tax rate than was tolerable (witness the initial proposed 
treatment of Windfall Tax) and a lack of negotiation with the industry. A smoother adjustment, 
might have avoided the more chaotic years of negotiation after 2008. However, by looking at the 
example of other countries, such as Tanzania, which renegotiated a break with their stability 
clauses, suggests less drastic actions were available to the Zambian government.. 
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The literature suggests the use of „renegotiation clauses‟ to allow an orderly renegotiation of the 
contract. Zambia is a good example that shows how chaotic the breaking of stability clauses can 
be. The tax reform process, started in 2008, has never been formally resolved. There continues 
to be some uncertainty over the status of the tax regime which may be depressing investment. A 
formal structure to guide this process would probably have been beneficial.  
5.2. Response to price changes 
Political pressure to break the fiscal stability clauses originated from a failure of the DA regime 
to provide significant government revenue when copper prices increased. This failure was the 
result of the tax structure, specifically the low mineral royalty rate (at 0.6 per cent), no excess 
profit tax (the variable profit tax and windfall tax was introduced in 2008), 100 per cent 
depreciation allowance, loss carry forward provision. In addition, the poor capacity of the tax 
authority and lack of tax avoidance safeguards may have contributed to low taxable profits 
during this period. Would a fiscal regime more responsive to price changes have been more 
stable? 
Such a fiscal regime may well have reduced political pressure for reform, but the bargaining 
conditions prevented it. The perceived riskiness of investment in Zambia prompted companies 
to seek terms that could increase the likelihood of making a quick return (and hence a delay in 
tax payments). The strong bargaining position of mining companies allowed them to 
successfully secure these terms. The result was an unresponsive tax regime. 
Many of the tax instruments in the DA regime had the effect of delaying tax payments. In a 
country with well-funded, diversified government finances, such a delay might be tolerable. In 
Zambia this was not the case.  The poor bargaining position forced the DA regime on the 
country, but the country could not tolerate it, and political pressure ensured eventual rejection of 
the deal. Zambia was caught in a trap.  
Conditions for the government did improve by 2008, but given the failure of the Windfall Tax, 
such improvement may not have been enough. While bargaining power had shifted it was not 
sufficient for the government to have complete freedom of action. Low administrative capacity, 
and possibly a flawed negotiation process contributed to this failure. 
The manner in which the Windfall Tax was imposed did not help. The tax was imposed in an 
environment of an increasing tax burden (not helped by the lack of deductability against other 
tax bases) and the breaking of the Development Agreements without negotiation. A more 
managed process in which mining companies are given some years to adjust to a new tax 
regime might have increased the chances of the Windfall Tax being accepted. Another approach 
might have been to propose variants to the Windfall Tax. Chile, for instance, levies a variable 
rate tax whose tax base includes some cost items but not all those included in a standard 
company income tax base. This may have been more acceptable to the high-cost mines that 
were most opposed to the Windfall Tax, while still being relatively easy to administer. However, it 
may also have been the case that the government simply did not have the resources and 
institutional structures to undertake this sort of negotiation and the development of proposals. 
The issue of diversification is an important one. Without any alternative income, pressure for tax 
reform was greater. The problem of diversification is less of a worry now. Having gone through 
the first wave of investment in the industry, Zambia now has a group of mines that are providing 
significant revenues to the treasury. This opens up policy options for the government. Tax 
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regimes offered to future investors can now afford to employ tax designs that allow companies 
to delay the point at which they start paying taxes. This gives much greater leeway for Zambia. 
Firstly, it gives them more bargaining chips to extract concessions in other areas. Secondly, it 
might reduce public pressure for reform, making the tax regime more stable, itself a benefit to 
the mining companies.38 
Given the inherent instability of the DA regime, was the industry short-sighted in agreeing to the 
privatisation contracts? The industry may have thought it could make a sufficient return before it 
was hit by some form of expropriation. However, much of the investment appears to have been 
made only a few years before 2008, following the rise in prices. Investment, prices and public 
pressure appear to have risen together, reducing the ability of the industry to make sufficient 
returns. As such, the industry must strive to make a sufficient return on these investments under 
a climate of greater instability – witness the changes made in 2012 and the increased strike 
activity. Copper prices may be high enough that a decent return is still being made, but a more 
reasoned approach to begin with may have given the industry an even better environment now. 
Although such analysis benefits from the power of hindsight. 
5.3. Capacity building 
A recurring theme in this paper has been the lack of government capacity, not only in calculating 
the true taxable base of mining companies, but also in the ability to propose different tax 
designs during the course of negotiations. The impact of this can be seen in a number of ways. 
Firstly, an inability to extract the correct amount of tax may have increased the tax gap and the 
potential benefits from expropriation. It also produced sufficient doubt that the mining companies 
were paying less than they should. This was compounded by the potential confusion over how 
the DA regime allowed companies to legally reduce their tax payments. The focus on much of 
the lobbying efforts by NGOs, particularly in 2009 and 2010, was the potential tax abuse 
undertaken by mining companies. Accusations of tax avoidance and evasion damaged the 
credibility of the industry and the government who were thought to be complicit in this behaviour. 
This fuelled the demands for reform that produced such instability. It limited the ability of policy 
makers to understand the credibility of threats used against them. Parliamentary records show 
that the industry‟s claims were questioned by parliamentarians (Committee of Estimates 2008 
and 2009), but no reports were published that provided strong evidence to the contrary. There 
was one report that indicated that one company‟s costs were lower than stated: the leaked audit 
report. Although this report was produced in 2010, long after arguments over the 2008 tax 
reform were concluded.39 The government did employ outside specialists in the 2008 reforms, 
but the confused manner in which they were handled suggests greater capacity in government 
would have been beneficial. 
Finally, the lack of capacity limited the scope of policy options available to the government. 
Greater capacity to administer more complex tax types would have allowed Zambia to offer 
more digestible taxes than the Windfall Tax. Tax authorities may always suffer from a lack of 
information to administer taxes perfectly, but the greater the capacity, the lower the costs of 
imposing profit-based taxes, allowing both parties to benefit. 
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 This highlights one benefit from employing tight ring-fencing arrangements. Where such regulations are not in place, the new 
investments may be used to reduce the taxes paid by the mature mines, limiting the effects of diversification within the mining 
industry. 
39
 Report available from http://www.scribd.com/Zambian-Economist/d/48512375-Pilot-Audit-Report-Mopani-Copper-Mine-Summary 
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In some ways, if this is true, one may wonder why any government would not make the effort to 
improve their tax authority and civil service. Even the costs of installing a complete team of 
international experts would be small in comparison with the large amounts that can be earned 
from natural resource extraction.40 This may be too simplistic. Changing any organisation is 
difficult, particularly a civil service in a country without a long tradition of such institutions. 
Dropping in an international team of experts, would not be free from complications. 
In any case, both the government and donors have recognised the benefits of greater tax 
administration capacity. A team of experts was hired in 2007 to work alongside the Zambian 
government staff who prepared the 2008 tax reforms, and there has been some donor support 
for the ZRA, firstly to conduct pilot audits of mining companies, and later, in 2011, a cooperative 
programme between the IMF, the Norwegian Tax Authority and the ZRA.  A Mining Tax Unit has 
also been established within the authority. Even with these efforts, it is likely that it will take 
some time before Zambia‟s lack of capacity stops being a constraint on its fiscal choices. 
There are some relatively quick and painless methods that have recently been taken that 
effectively enhance capacity. Table 2.Table 2.3 shows that the loopholes for tax abuse have 
slowly been closed. Elements such as ring-fencing and the treatment of hedging income have 
made ZRA‟s job easier. Unlike the investment in capacity in ZRA, this approach should produce 
immediate results.  
6. Conclusion 
Zambia‟s mining tax reforms were, and still remain, an emotive subject in the country, and have 
often invoked claims of corruption and malpractice by government and industry alike. Whether 
these claims are true or not, this paper has shown that much of the mining tax reforms in 
Zambia can be analysed through the less emotive approach of a bargaining framework. Using 
this framework, the tax reforms can be attributed to the pendulum swing in bargaining powers of 
the government and mining companies. Importantly, the paper also shows the frictions and 
harmful dynamics that this pendulum swing produced. 
Firstly, the level of political risk initially perceived may have encouraged mining companies to 
adopt a short-term strategy of making a return as quickly as possible. Coupled with the 
government's low bargaining power, this produced a tax regime that was inherently unstable. 
The increase in copper prices revealed this instability. The result was as the obsolescing 
bargaining models predicts. But the resulting tax reform was not a clean process. It produced 
years of instability, a breakdown in relations between Zambians and the industry, and 
contributed to political change. This probably increased the perceived risk to future investors. 
In addition, the latest 2012 tax regime is probably more regressive than the other regimes. In 
some ways, the 2012 regime may benefit Zambia, given its still low capacity to administer taxes, 
and provide revenue sooner than a more profit-based regime would do. On the other hand it will 
make a number of marginal investment projects nonviable, risking lobbying pressure for a future 
reduction in taxes. The problem of diversification is also less of an issue now, given that Zambia 
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has a group of mature mines paying taxes. This gives policy makers greater leeway to use more 
progressive tax structures that allow companies to recoup their costs before taxing their profits.  
The paper has questioned to what extent the safe-guards against instability employed in Zambia 
worked, and whether other solutions proposed in the literature may have improved the situation. 
It shows that, while not foolproof, legally-binding contracts to stabilise tax rates have a 
potentially strong role to play, although they themselves may exacerbate the costs of reform 
when it occurs. Combined with some form of renegotiation clause may help limit this problem, 
although how this is actually done may be difficult. 
Zambia‟s story suggests that a stable tax regime needs to show some response to prices in the 
short-term (to appease public pressure), alongside some means to allow companies to expense 
investment costs (to attract investors).  These two objectives may be contradictory and a trade-
off is required. There may be a case for a tax whose base is not affected by capital allowances, 
and possibly using a progressive and relatively small rate. Such a tax would provide at least 
some revenue to the public during periods of high prices, dissipating public pressure, yet not be 
too damaging to expected returns for investors. If such a tax can indeed act to dissipate public 
pressure, a mining company may be willing to pay for the assurance. The Windfall Tax had a 
similar aim, but the history of confusion over this tax in Zambia has made such a policy unviable 
now. 
Whatever tax types are proposed, the paper shows that they must be implemented in an 
enabling environment. Building capacity to regulate a mining industry, in particular, is one 
element within the control of government, and provides a range of benefits from reducing the 
corroding problem of tax abuses, creating greater tax policy options, and ultimately providing 
government with an additional form of bargaining power. 
 
  
36 
 
References  
Adam, C., and Simpasa, A. (2010) Harnessing Resource Revenues for Prosperity in  
Zambia, OxCarre Research Paper 36 
Afrik News (2009) Zambia‟s Copper-dependent Economy at a Breaking Point, 21 February.  
Available at: http://www.afrik-news.com/article15332.html. [Accessed on 4 October 2011] 
Anandalingam, G., (1987)  Asymmetric Players and Bargaining for Profit Shares in Natural  
Resource Development. Management Science, 33(8), pp. 1048-1057 
Auty, R., (2006) Maximising the Positive Socio-Economic Impact of Mineral Extraction on  
Regional Development in Transition Economies: A Review of the Literature, European  
Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
Bank of Zambia, Statistics Fortnightly. Available at: http://www.boz.zm/ 
Barham, B. L.; Chavas, J.-P. and Coomes, O. T. (1998) Sunk Costs and the Natural Resource  
Extraction Sector: Analytical Models and Historical Examples of Hysteresis and Strategic  
Behavior in the Americas, Land Economics, 74(4), pp. 429-448 
Becker, G. S. (1983) A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,  
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(3), pp. 371-400 
Calder, J. (2010) Resource Tax Administration: the Implications of Alternative Policy Choices. In:  
(eds) Daniel, P. et al. The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, problems and 
practice. London. Routledge for International Monetary Fund 
Zambia, Central Statistical Office. Available at: http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/ 
Chamber of Mines (2010) Presentation to the Public Discussion Forum at Solwezi on Mining  
Taxation in Zambia, Solwezi. 16 July 2010. Available at: 
http://mines.org.zm/images/stories/cmz-
_committee_on_economic_affairs_final_06_jan_2011.pdf 
Chang, R.; Hevia, C. and Loayza, N. (2009) Privatization and Nationalization Cycles. NBER  
Working Paper Series 
Christian Aid, (2007) A rich seam: who benefits from rising commodity prices? Available at:  
http://www.christianaid.org.uk/Images/a_rich_seam.pdf 
Collier, P. (2010) Principles of Resource Taxation for Low-income Countries. In (eds) Daniel, P.  
et al. The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, problems and practice. 
London. Routledge for International Monetary Fund 
Zambia, Committee on Economic Affairs and Labour (2009) First Report For The Fourth  
Session Of The Tenth National Assembly 4th September 2009. Available: 
http://www.parliament.gov.zm 
(2007) Report For The First Session Of The Tenth National Assembly  8 November. p. 9. 
Available : http://www.parliament.gov.zm 
Zambia, Committee on Estimates. (2008)  Report of the Committee on Estimates for the Second  
Session of The Tenth National Assembly. 25 January. p. 98. Available: 
http://www.parliament.gov.zm 
37 
 
Chamber of Mines. (2010). Presentation to the Public Discussion Forum at Solwezi on Mining 
taxation in Zambia. Solwezi, 16th July 
Committee on Estimates. (2009)  First Report Of The Committee On Estimates For The Forth  
Session Of The Tenth National Assembly. 23 September. Available : 
http://www.parliament.gov.zm 
Conrad, R. (2012) Zambia’s Mineral Tax Regime. Available at:  
http://www.theigc.org/sites/default/files/bob_conrad_zambiamineralfiscalregime_
march2012.pdf 
Craig, J. (2001) Privatisation into Practice: The Case of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines  
Limited, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 39(3), pp. 389-410 
Crawford, V. P., (1985)  Dynamic Games and Dynamic Contract Theory. The Journal of Conflict  
Resolution, 29(2), pp. 195-224 
Daniel, P. & Sunley, E., (2010)  Contractual assurances of fiscal stability. In (eds) Daniel,  
P. et al. The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, problems and practice. 
London. Routledge for International Monetary Fund 
Daniel, P. et al. (2010a)  Evaluating fiscal regimes for resource projects: an example  
from oil development. In (eds) Daniel, P. et al. The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: 
Principles, problems and practice. London. Routledge for International Monetary Fund 
Daniel, D. et al. (2010b)  Introduction. In (eds) Daniel, P. et al. The Taxation of Petroleum and  
Minerals: Principles, problems and practice. London. Routledge for International 
Monetary Fund 
Dolbear, B., (various 2006 to 2010)  Ranking of countries for mining investment. Available at:  
http://www.dolbear.com/announcements/2012-ranking-of-countries-for-mining-
investment-or-where-not-to-invest 
Duncan, R., (2006)  Costs and consequences of the expropriation of FDI by host  
governments. Working Paper. School of Marketing and Management, Charles Sturt 
University, Bathurst 
Dymond, A., (2007)  Undermining Development? Copper Mining in Zambia, ActSA, Christian  
Aid, SCIAF 
Economics Association of Zambia, (2008)  Memorandum to the Estimate Committee on Mineral  
Taxes. 8th September . Available at: www.eaz.org.zm 
Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa. Available at: http://www.eisa.org.za/ 
Engel, E. & Fischer, R., (2010)  Optimal Resource Extraction Contract Under Threat of  
Expropriation. In (eds) Daniel, P. et al The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: 
Principles, problems and practice. London. Routledge for International Monetary Fund 
Ferguson, J.(1999) Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the  
Zambian Copperbelt. University of California Press 
First Quantum Minerals (2008) Consolidated Financial Statements – Third Quarter. 30  
September, 2008. Available at:  
http://www.first-quantum.com/Theme/FirstQuantum/files/doc_financials/2008Q3.pdf 
Fraser, A. and Lungu, J. (2007)  For whom the windfalls? Winners and losers in the privatisation  
of Zambia’s copper mines, Civil Society Trade Network of Zambia / Catholic Centre for 
Justice, Development and Peace 
38 
 
Gould, J. A. & Winters, M. S. (2007)  An Obsolescing Bargain in Chad: Shifts in Leverage  
Between the Government and the World Bank, Business and Politics, 9(2)  
Haglund, D., (2010)  Policy Evolution and Organisational Learning in Zambia’s Mining Sector,  
Ph. D. University of Bath 
Hogan, W., Sturzenegger, F. and Tai, L. (2010) Contracts and Investment in Natural Resources.  
In (eds) Hogan, W. and Sturzenegger, F. The Natural Resources Trap. London: MIT 
Press 
Irin News (2009)  Copper loses its shine and the Copperbelt its jobs. 20 February. Available at:  
http://www.irinnews.org/Report/83047/ZAMBIA-Copper-loses-its-shine-and-Copperbelt-
its-jobs [Accessed on 4 October 2011] 
Jensen, N. M. and Johnston, N. P. (2010) Political Risk, Reputation and the Resource Curse.  
Available at: Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1667515 
Kaunda, F. (2002)  Selling the Family Silver. Lusaka:Interpak Books 
Lambrechts, K. (2009)  Breaking the Curse: How Transparent Taxation and Fair Taxes can Turn  
Africa’s, Southern African Resource Watch, TWIN Africa, Tax Justice Network for Africa, 
Action Aid, Christian Aid 
Lungu, J. (2008)  Politics of reforming Zambia’s mining tax regime, Resource Insight Issue No.8.  
Southern African Resource Watch. Available at: 
http://www.sarwatch.org/publications/resource-insight/37-resources-insight/601-the-
politics-of-reforming-zambias-mining-tax-regime.html 
Lusaka Times, (2008a) Luanshya Copper Mine halts operations, 1 740 lose jobs.  
Available at: http://www.lusakatimes.com/2008/12/21/luanshya-copper-mine-halts-
operation1740-lose-jobs/. [Accessed on 4 October 2011] 
Lusaka Times, (2008b) MUZ and NUMAW see no benefit from windfall tax. 14 January 
Available at: http://www.lusakatimes.com/2008/01/14/muz-and-numaw-see-no-benefit-
from-windfall-tax/  [Accessed on 4 October 2011] 
Lusaka Times, (2010)  State won’t reintroduce windfall tax, maintains Mwale. 10 May. Available  
at: http://www.lusakatimes.com/2010/05/10/state-wont-reindroduce-windfall-tax-
maintains-mwale/  [Accessed on 4 October 2011] 
Lusaka Times, (2012) Zambia copper investment tops US$5b. Available at:  
http://www.lusakatimes.com/2012/03/27/zambia-copper-investment-tops-us5b/. 
[Accessed on 4 October 2011] 
Marsh, R. (2000) Host country-foreign investor bargaining power and investment incentive  
provisions in multilateral investment agreements. University of Oxford Discussion Paper 
Series. Available at: http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:5c300da9-b52b-41e7-aff8-
2802ea62179b 
McMahon, F and Cervantes, M. (various 2005 to 2011)  Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining  
Companies. Fraser Institute 
Mine Watch (2008) „Scott threatens to lead demos if companies take legal action on tax‟. 29  
February. Available at: http://minewatchzambia.blogspot.co.uk/2008/02/scott-threatens-
to-lead-demos-if.html 
39 
 
(2008)  „Vedanta "We shall not go to court nor renegotiate the new tax measures"‟. 7 
April. Available at: http://minewatchzambia.blogspot.co.uk/2008/04/vedanta-we-shall-not-
go-to-court-nor.html 
MiningMX (2008)  Legal defence mooted on Zambian tax shock. 9 February. Available  
at:http://cms.privatelabel.co.za/pls/cms/iac.page?p_t1=1720&p_t2=3865&p_t3=10903&p
_t4=14374&p_dynamic=YP&p_content_id=882760&p_site_id=83 
Ministerial Statement (2010)  Ministerial Statement by the Minister of Finance and National  
Planning Hon. Dr. S. Musokotwane, MP on the Status of Mining Taxation presented to 
the House on the 25th of November, 2010. Available at: http://www.parliament.gov.zm 
Muthoo, A. (2000) A Non-technical Introduction to Bargaining Theory, World Economics 1(2)   
Pp. 145-166 
Reuters, (2008)  „Canada's First Quantum cuts jobs at Zambia mine‟. 25 November. Available  
at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/11/25/zambia-minerals-workers-
idUSLP39394520081125. [Accessed on 4 October 2011] 
Reuters (2011) „Zambia could cut mine royalties if prices collapse‟. 9 December. Available at:  
http://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFJOE7B806S20111209 [Accessed 
on 4 October 2011] 
Rigobon, R., (2010)  Dealing with Expropriations. In (eds) Daniel, P. et al. The Taxation of  
Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, problems and practice. London. Routledge for 
International Monetary Fund 
Summers, L. (2010)  Commentary to Petroleum Contracts: What Does Contract Theory Tell Us?  
In (eds) Hogan, W. & Sturzenegger, F. The Natural Resources Trap. London: MIT Press 
State House (2010)  Kansanshi Declares Huge Dividend. 11 May. Available at:  
http://www.statehouse.gov.zm/index.php/component/content/article/48-featured-
items/618-kansanshi-declares-huge-dividend 
World Bank Group, (2007)  The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Scoping Study for  
the Republic of Zambia, Available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEXTINDTRAINI/Resources/zambia_scoping_repo
rt.pdf?resourceurlname=zambia_scoping_report.pdf 
World Bank, (2011)  What would it take for Zambia’s copper mining industry to achieve its  
potential? Available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTZAMBIA/Resources/copper-mining-summary-
note(online-copy).pdf 
ZCCM-IH annual reports 2005 to 2011. Available at: http://www.zccm-ih.com.zm 
International Centre for Tax and Development
at the Institute of Development Studies
Brighton BN1 9RE, UK 
T: +44 (0)1273 606261
F: +44 (0)1273 621202
E:  info@ictd.ac
www.ictd.ac
